The Peloponnesian War was a major conflict that took place in Ancient Greece between the years 431-404 B.C.
It was fought between the city-states of the Delian League, which was controlled by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, which was under the influence of Sparta.
Ultimately, the war ended in a victory for Sparta and the Peloponnesian League, but at a great cost to all involved camps. The Peloponnesian War is considered one of the most significant conflicts in ancient history because it marked both the end of Athens’ Golden Age and the rise of Sparta as the hegemon in Greece.
Let us explore together these 62 facts about the Peloponnesian War, one of the most devastating conflicts of the Ancient World.
Key facts about the Peloponnesian War:
1. One of the many pretexts of this war is represented by the Battle of Sybota, a minor naval engagement between the city-states of Corinth and its colony Corcyra.
Corinth was part of the Peloponnesian League, while Corcyra who wanted to gain independence, received naval support from Athens.
The battle ended in a stalemate, with both sides claiming victory.
2. Socrates, the great Athenian philosopher, personally fought in 3 major battles of the Peloponnesian War: the Siege of Potidaea, the Battle of Delium, and the Battle of Amphipolis.
During the Battle of Potidaea, Socrates saved the life of Alcibiades, the Athenian leader who would later play a major role during the Decelean phase of the war(415-404 B.C).
3. The real cause of the Peloponnesian War is represented by the great rivalry between Athens and Sparta over the control of Greece.
The Spartans feared that if the Athenian power was left unchecked, it could one day have the potential to weaken the Spartan control over the Peloponnesian League.
4. The Spartans’ strategy in the first phase of the war, can be best described as simplistic.
The Spartans hoped to lure the Athenians outside their heavy fortifications by continuing to invade and plunder the countryside in Attica every year.
The Spartan strategy failed, because the Athenians knowing about the supremacy of Spartan infantry, refused to give battle on open ground.
5. The Battle of Delium represents the first major land military setback for Athens in this war and the beginning of the rise of the Beotian League to the status of regional power.
6. For most of the first phase of the war(known as the Archidamian War), Athens avoided any major land engagement with the superior hoplite army of Sparta and its allies.
Instead, the Athenians adopted a more clever strategy.
While their army adopted a defensive stance behind the fortifications of Athens, the superior Athenian navy constantly raided the shores of the Peloponnesian Peninsula; which was under Spartan control.
7. The mastermind behind the Athenian strategy used in the first phase of the war was Pericles.
8. Thucydides “History of the Peloponnesian War” is the most important historical source about this conflict, but not the only one.
Some events of the Peloponnesian War are also recorded in other historical works:
a) Hellenica written by Xenophon
b) “Bibliotheca Historica”, books 12 & 13 written by Diodorus Siculus
c) Plutarch in “Parallel Lives” had 4 biographies of the most important figures of the Peloponnesian War: Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lysander.
9. The course of the Peloponnesian War and its outcome were ultimately decided by the Persian Empire. The Achaemenid Empire entered the conflict on the Spartan side.
The intervention of the Persian Empire tipped the balance of power in favor of Sparta.
10. According to Thucydides, the vote in the Spartan assembly(also known as Apella) for the declaration of war against Athens was initially too close, that the Ephor who presided over the meetings of the Assembly, had to use a special procedure to determine the final results.
With a clear majority, the Spartan assembly decides to declare war against Athens.
11. The Battle of Mantinea was the biggest land battle of the Peloponnesian War.
During this battle, a large coalition of “democratic” cities under the sphere of Athens planned to capture the strategic city of Tegea and blockade Sparta.
The pro-Athenian coalition failed to win this battle and Sparta took advantage to rebuild the Peloponnesian League and regain the hegemony over Peloponnese.
12. It is still debatable which of the 2 ancient Greek city-states started the Peloponnesian War.
Athens and Sparta if we analyze the words of Thucydides, played a game of cat and mouse with the justifications for going to war against each other.
Both sides claimed with their arguments that they were “forced” to go to war.
13. At the beginning of the war, Athens had a major financial advantage due to the relocation of the Delian League treasures inside of the Parthenon.
According to Thucydides, inside the Parthenon, there were 6000 talents of silver and other 500 talents of other precious metals.
14. At the beginning of the war, the fleet of the Peloponnesian League was only 150 ships strong(most of them supplied by Corinth) only half of the strength of the Athenian active fleet.
15. The total strength of the main Athenian army and its garrison is estimated by some historians at around 30.000 troops.
16. The Spartan Army represented only 10% of the total strength of the Peloponnesian League army.
17. According to Donald Kagan, the plague in Athens wiped out around 34% of the total strength of the Athenian land army.
Its impact could also be observed on the field of battle. At the start of the war, Athens could field at once even 13.000 troops for a single battle. In 424 B.C. during the Battle of Delium, the Athenians were able to deploy only 7000 total troops.
18. Sthenelaidas was the leader of the pro-war faction against Athens, and the mastermind behind the final decision of the Spartan assembly. He was one of the 5 Ephors of Sparta.
19. There were 3 major pretexts for the starting of the Peloponnesian War: Corinth’s dispute with Corcyra; the Athenian commercial blockade against Megara and the rebellion of the city of Potidaea.
20. The Athenian fleet had 3 major roles during the entire Peloponnesian War:
a) to help maintain the control of the colonies and city-states under the influence of the Delian League
b) to keep safe the food supplies routes via sea.
c) to harass the Spartan shores and help incite helot rebellions
21. Athens attempted to kick the Boeotian League out of the war by inciting local rebellions of the pro-democratic cities inside Beotia while simultaneously attacking the region from 2 sides.
This strategy culminated with the Battle of Delium and it ended disastrously for Athens.
22. During the Archidamian phase of the War, Attica was invaded 5 times by the forces of the Peloponnesian League.
The results were not decisive, since the Athenians refused to offer battle in the open field.
23. During the Archidamian war, the longest Spartan invasion of Attica lasted for 40 days, while the shortest was only 15 days.
24. The first phase, known as the Archidamian War(after the Spartan King Archidamus II), lasted for ten years and was characterized by the Spartan strategy of invasions of Attica, the region surrounding Athens, while Athens constantly used its navy to raid the coast of the Peloponnesian Peninsula.
25. According to Thucydides, after the Battle of Delium, the Thebans led by Pagondas deployed a primitive version of a flamethrower to demolish the Athenian fortifications near the Temple of Apollo.
26. For the total expenses of the war effort during the first 10 years, some historians estimate that Athens could’ve built 2 more Parthenons every year.
27. The small city of Plataea had vital strategic importance because it controlled the roads between Beotia and Peloponnese Peninsula.
At the start of the war, the Thebans attempted to quickly capture Plataea with the help of a covert operation. Unfortunately for the Thebans, the Plateans discovered the plan and expelled the small invading force from their city.
28. After capturing a significant Spartan force during the Battles of Pylos and Sphacteria; the Athenians used their prisoners as a bargaining tool with maximum efficiency.
By threatening the execution of the prisoners, the Athenians convinced the Spartans to cease their annual invasions of Attica in 424 B.C.
29. The deaths of both Kleon and Brasidas left large power vacuums in both Athens and Sparta which were exploited by the leaders of the pro-peace factions.
The final result was the signing of the Peace of Nicias in 421 B.C.
30. In theory the Peace of Nicias had to last 50 years, unfortunately, the peace was broken after only 6 years.
31. The establishment of the Spartan fort in the village of Decelea contributed decisively to blocking the Athenian access to the precious silver mines of Laurion. (according to some estimates the silver mines provided 25% of Athens’s GDP)
32. According to Athenian orator Andocides, in 420 BCE, Athens supported the rebellion of Amorges against the Persian King, Darius II Nothus.
This decision would later prove to be a big mistake after the disastrous Sicilian Expedition because it served as one of the main reasons for the Persian intervention in the Peloponnesian War.
33. The Athenian strategy proved to be the most effective during the Archidamian phase of the war, while the Spartan strategy was the most effective during the second phase of the war.
34. The Peace of Nicias was concluded on the principle of “status quo antebellum”, which means that each side involved in the conflict would keep all its territories before the war.
Effectively the first part of the war ended in a stalemate.
35. Because of the Peace of Nicias, some modern-day historians view the Peloponnesian War as 2 separate conflicts and categorize them as The Archidamian War and The Decelean War.
36. As a consequence of the catastrophic Sicilian Expedition, Athens experienced a severe leadership crisis.
37. By accepting the negotiations with the Persians for financial support, the Spartans renounced to one of their early and most important propaganda tools of the war.
During the Archidamian War, the Spartans often presented themselves as the “Greek Liberators”.
38. Based on rough estimates at the beginning of the conflict, Athens had a 3:1 superiority in ships, while the Peloponnesian League had a superiority of 3:1 in land forces.
39. Despite the heavy losses in men and ships suffered during the Sicilian Expedition, the Athenians managed to regain the strategic initiative in the Battle of Cyzicus 410 BC.
40. In the short term, the Spartans were the winners of the Peloponnesian war because they accomplished their main war goal, to demolish the Athenian hegemony over Greece.
In the long run, it is a completely different story.
41. The real winner of the Peloponnesian War is the Boeotian League with its most important city, Thebes.
Thanks to the devastating conflict between Athens and Sparta, the Beotian League rose to the status of Regional Power.
42. The “Melian Dialogue” from Thucydides’ History represents one of the most important sources of inspiration for modern-day political realism.
43. The Spartans won the war, not only because of the financial support received from the Persians but also because they changed their overall strategy against Athens.
44. The Spartan Hegemony, obtained at a great cost after the Peloponnesian War, proved to be a fragile one and it lasted until the Battle of Leuctra(371 BC).
45. Indirectly, the Persians can also be considered winners of the Peloponnesian War.
Because they supported the Spartans, they manage to regain the lost Ionian Greek City-States and also gained some diplomatic influence inside mainland Greece.
46. Athens suffered a humiliating defeat and the peace terms were harsh.
The Athenians were forced to demolish their walls and dismantle their democratic regime.
The Athenian democracy was replaced with an oligarchical pro-Spartan regime which today is known as the “Thirty Tyrants”.
47. The oligarchical regime installed by the Spartans in Athens only lasted for 8 months.
48. In the long run, the Peloponnesian War paved the way for the rise of Macedon.
49. The fate of the war was ultimately decided during the decisive Battle of Aegospotami, where the Spartan fleet led by Lysander crushed the Athenian navy.
This decisive naval victory, allowed the Spartans to completely blockade Athens from both land and the sea.
With all supply routes completely blocked and without any means to regain the military initiative, the Athenians were forced to capitulate.
50. The Battles of Pylos and Sphacteria mark a departure from the Periclean strategy because it is the first time when Athens used its navy not only for raiding but for establishing a fortified outpost inside the Spartan territory.
51. The longest siege battles of the Peloponnesian War were: the Siege of Syracuse(415-413 BC) and The Siege of Plataea(429-427)
52. Brasidas was the most successful Spartan military commander during the first phase of the Peloponnesian War.
In a short timeframe(423-422 B.C.), he turned the tide of the war in favor of Sparta by preventing the Athenians from capturing Megara and then launching a surprise and decisive campaign against the Athenian colonies in Thrace.
The lightning campaign in Thrace saw the quick capture of many cities loyal to Athens, including the strategic city of Amphipolis.
53. The famous Greek philosopher, Socrates also participated in the Battle of Delium, another major encounter of the war.
54. Between the years 407-406 BC, the total value of the Persian financial support for the Peloponnesian fleet is estimated between 549-639 talents(source: Persian Interventions The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450–386 BCE, John. O Hyland, page 110)
55. The Ancient Greek historians who recorded the Peloponnesian war never mention an exact figure for the total Persian financial support offered to Sparta.
According to modern-day historians, Persian financial support over 8 years of the war was estimated between 3272 and 3672 talents. (Source: Persian Interventions The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450–386 BCE, John.O Hyland, page 119)
56. Cyrus the Younger, son of Darius II, was the Persian prince responsible for the ultimate triumph of the Spartan coalition.
57. If we take Thucydides’ words for granted, Sparta during the events of 431 B.C. was left without options.
If the Spartans didn’t start the war, they risked 2 catastrophic scenarios:
a)The growing and unstoppable Athenian power
b) Major loss of influence over the Peloponnesian League.
From this perspective, the Spartans had to launch “a preemptive strike” to counter the above-mentioned scenarios from becoming a reality.
58. Thucydides correctly points out that Athens lost the war because it abandoned the “Periclean strategy” used in the first years.
This view is also supported by many modern historians because as we all know, Athens during this war sought to expand its Empire(see the Sicilian Expedition), instead of focusing on a more defensive strategy, which was favored by Pericles.
59. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War doesn’t cover all the conflict. It suddenly stops at the year 411 B.C.
Two plausible scenarios, either the author didn’t live long enough to finish the book or the remaining chapters of this historical work were lost in history.
60. The Siege of Potidaea proved to be very costly for Athens. For the wages of their hoplites and the other siege works, the Athenians spent 2000 talents. That is 33.33% of the mentioned 6000 talents from the Parthenon treasury at the beginning of the war.
61. Contrary to Thucydides’ descriptions, Sparta’s biggest fear was not Athens’s growing military power.
Despite being at the peak of its power in 431 B.C, Athens was far from being capable to challenge the Peloponnesian League and defeat each Spartan ally one by one, through military means.
More likely, Sparta’s biggest fear was that the Athenian power could, through diplomacy and financial strength, coerce or convince other members of the Peloponnesian League to switch sides.
62. From a total of around 100 siege battles, only 58 were successful for the attackers.
We hope that you have found these statistics and facts about the Peloponnesian War interesting and educational while also learning something new about significant events in the Ancient Greek world.
Sources and further reading about the Peloponnesian War
- Victor Davis Hanson; Wars of the Ancient Greeks (Smithsonian History of Warfare), HarpPeren
- Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano; Men of Bronze – Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece, Princeton University Press
- Philip De Souza; The Peloponnesian War, 431-404 BC, Osprey Publishing Limited
- John O. Hyland; Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450-386 BCE, Johns Hopkins University Press
- The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 5: The Fifth Century BC (Volume 5) by David M. Lewis (Editor), John Boardman (Editor), J. K. Davies (Editor), M. Ostwald (Editor)
- Athanasios G. Platias, Kōnstantinos Koliopoulos; Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today, Oxford University Press
- Thucydides; The Peloponnesian War Oxford World’s Classics, Translated by Martin Hammond, P. J. Rhodes
- Jennifer T. Roberts; The Plague of War: Athens, Sparta, and the Struggle for Ancient Greece (Ancient Warfare and Civilization) Oxford University Press.